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THE REAL PROBLEM OF NO BEST WORLD
Frances and Daniel Howard-Snyder

Jove, an essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient and morally good
being, faced with a choice of which world to create (where for any he might
create there is a better) randomly selects no. 777. Is he, therefore, morally
surpassable? William Rowe says "yes". For Thor, an essentially omnipotent
and essentially omniscient being in Jove's predicament who does not randomly create but selects no. 888 because he is prepared to select no world
less than no. 888, has a degree of moral goodness that exceeds Jove's. By
exploring two options-either Thor has a reason for being so prepared or
he doesn't-we question the coherency of Rowe's Thor.

In "How an Unsurpassable Being Can Create a Surpassable World" (Faith
and Philosophy 11, April 1994,260-68), we argued that we have no reason
to think that an essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient and morally unsurpassable being cannot create a world that is morally inferior to
some other world that he or some other being could have created. To see
this, we envisaged Jove-an essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient and good creator-"discovering" that for any world he creates
there is a morally better one he could create. Faced with this predicament, we argued that, after sorting and ranking the worlds according to
certain reasonable criteria (in order to eliminate worlds with, e.g., persons whose lives are irredeemable), if Jove randomly created, say, world
no. 777, he would not thereby be shown to be morally surpassable. Our
argument consisted in determining whether other essentially omnipotent
and essentially omniscient beings faced with Jove's predicament could
act in ways that showed that they were morally superior to Jove. Our
conclusion was that, so far as we could see, they could not.
William Rowe, in "The Problem of No Best World" (Faith and Philosophy
11, April 1994, 269-71), responded to our argument by imagining an essentially omnipotent and essentially omniscient being in Jove's predicament,
Thor, who does not randomly create a world 'but selects world no. 888
over Jove's world no. 777 because he sees that it is better and prefers creating no. 888 to creating any lesser world." Rowe writes that
Thor's degree of moral goodness presumably is such that he is
prepared to settle for world no. 888, but not to settle for the
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 13 No.3 July 1996
All rights reserved

422

THE REAL PROBLEM OF NO BEST WORLD

423

world (no. 777) that Jove's degree of moral goodness allows him
to settle for. We thus have reason to believe that Thor's degree
of moral goodness exceeds Jove's, that Thor is morally better
than Jove. (270)
It appears that, according to Rowe, what makes Thor morally superior is
the fact that he has a higher standard than Jove. Worlds which Jove considers acceptable, Thor rejects as unacceptable. Thus Thor, unlike Jove, is
not prepared to settle for any world less than no. 888.
What should we make of this interesting challenge?
For starters, note that either Thor has a reason for being so prepared,
and so selects no. 888 as the cutoff point according to some general principle, or he does not have a reason. We contend that by exploring each of
these options, one can see that Rowe's story about Thor is, for all anybody reasonably believes, incoherent.
I

Suppose that Thor has a reason for being prepared to select no
world less than no. 888. Of course, not any old reason will do. Here
are three constraints. First, Thor's reason must not be morally defective or wholly frivolous. If Thor is prepared to create no world less
than no. 888 because he is vain or simply fond of that number, then
the fact that he is prepared to create no world less than no. 888 does
not show that he is better than Jove. Secondly, Thor's reason must not
be a reason which Jove uses initially to sort worlds. Thirdly, whatever
reason Thor has for not creating a world less than no. 888 must not
also be a reason to create a world better than no. 888. For example,
suppose Thor's reason is this: worlds numbered 888 and higher are
better than worlds numbered 887 and lower. This reason relies on the
general principle that if world w is better than world w-l, then w-l is
unacceptable for creation. Any being who accepted an instance of this
principle when it involved the world no. 888 but did not accept other
instances of it would be irrational, and hence not essentially omniscient. Any being who accepted the principle in its full generality
would be led never to create, given (as we are supposing) that for
each world there is a better.
So, our question is this: are there any principles that meet these constraints and which Thor acts on but Jove does not?
Of crucial importance here is the fact that if there is a finite number of
principles that meet these constraints, then we can stipulate that Jove
acts on the highest of them, and thus Rowe's story about Thor is obviously incoherent (since it has Thor acting on a higher principle than
Jove) and poses no objection to our argument.
We can imagine someone sympathetic with Rowe picking up on this
last point and answering our question as follows: "It is possible for Thor
to act on a principle which was neither morally defective nor frivolous
nor such that anyone who embraced it would be rationally compelled to
rule out more and more worlds ad infinitum. But since for every princi-
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pIe there is one which expresses a higher standard, Jove had to embrace
one which was not the highest. For any principle Jove possibly
embraces, however, I stipulate that Thor embraces a higher one that
would result in his treating as unacceptable some worlds that Jove
would treat as acceptable. Thus, Thor is necessarily morally superior to
Jove, and the principle on which he acts meets the constraints you laid
down above."
Has our hypothetical interlocutor really expressed a coherent possibility here? If it is coherent, then the principle that Thor acts on must
have these features:
1.
It divides the worlds into two groups (the acceptable and
the unacceptable).
2.
It is a reasonable principle that a morally good being might
well use to sort worlds.
3.
It is such that it is not irrational to act in accordance with it
without acting in accordance with one which expresses a
higher standard.
4.
It is such that there is another principle which treats as
unacceptable some of the worlds which were treated as
acceptable by it, and that other principle is such that there
is a third principle which treats as unacceptable some of
the worlds which were treated as acceptable by the second,
and so on, ad infinitum.
Here are some principles which seem to satisfy constraints I, 2 and 3.
a.
No world in which beings live lives which are not worth
living is acceptable.
No world in which beings experience gratuitous suffering
b.
is acceptable.
c.
No world in which beings live lives which are not as
happy and fulfilled as those lives could possibly be is
acceptable.
d.
No world empty of sentient, rational beings is acceptable.
But, do these principles satisfy constraint 4? Some of them partially do.
For example, b seems to express a higher standard than a. But why suppose that for every such principle, there is a higher? It seems odd to say
the least that there should be infinitely many such general principles. At
least we see no reason to accept that there are.
On the supposition that Thor has a reason for being prepared to create no world less than no. 888, it is, at best, unclear whether Rowe's
story about Thor is coherent.
II

Let us now explore the second option. Suppose that Thor has no reason for being prepared to select no world less than no. 888. In that case,
either he selects no. 888 arbitrarily as his minimally acceptable world, or
he is constrained to do so by causes over which he has no control. If the
former, then in every morally relevant respect, he acts no differently
from Jove. If the latter, then we are to think of him as driven by his
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nature, say, his compassion or perfectionism, which is in part constituted by or results in his preparedness to select no world less than no. 888.
But in that case, his preparedness is nothing other than a tendency to
act in accordance with (as opposed to a tendency to act on) some principle
such as a-d above. Everything we have said about principles above,
however, applies here. Either there are infinitely many such principles
for Thor to act in accordance with or there are not. If there are not, then
we stipulate that Jove can choose to act on the highest, and so Thor is
morally no better than Jove. If there are, then either the one that Thor
acts in accordance with satisfies constraint 3 or it does not. If it doesn't,
then Thor would be irrational in picking world no. 888 as his minimum,
and hence not essentially omniscient. If it does, then provided it satisfied
all other constraints, Thor would be morally better than Jove, but it is not
reasonable to believe that there are infinitely many principles which satisfy constraints 1-3.
We conclude, then, that Rowe's story about Thor can be used to show
that Jove is morally surpassable only if Thor acts on or in accordance
with a principle for selecting worlds to create, and that principle meets
constraint 4. But, it is not reasonable to believe that there is such a principle and, thus, for all anybody reasonably believes, Rowe's story about
Thor is incoherent. Indeed, it nicely highlights the fact that the real problem of no best world is that, contra Rowe, we have no reason to think
that an essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient and morally
unsurpassable being cannot create a world that is morally inferior to
some other world that he or some other being could have created.
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